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THE DARK SIDE OF THE DOT COM—
PROTECTING TRADEMARK USE IN THE POST
DOMAIN PATHS OF URLS: INTERACTIVE
PRODUCTS CORPORATION V. A2Z MOBILE OFFICE
SOLUTIONS, 326 F.3D 687 (6TH CIR. 2003)
Eugene P. Sunday*

I. INTRODUCTION
A basic purpose of trademark law is to prevent customer confusion
between products or services of a same or similar nature.1 With the
explosive growth of the Internet over the last decade, courts have struggled
to keep up with issues involving trademark protection on the Internet.
These cases have largely been solved by applying legal theories used prior
to the Internet,2 resulting in the protection of trademarks in domain names,3
use of trademarks as “metatags,”4 and use of trademarks on web pages.5
Although the use of trademarks in a non-trademark way6 is permitted under

* Staff Writer 2003-2004, University of Dayton Law Review; J.D. expected May 2005, University
of Dayton School of Law; B.S., Chemical Engineering, 2002 University of Texas at Austin. The author
would like to express his thanks to his friends and family for their support during the past two years and
to Professors Jeffery Matsuura, Gretchen Bender, Maria Crist, and Susan Elliot for their insight and aid
in the development of this Note.
1
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995) (stating “In principle,
trademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying mark, ‘reduce[s] the customer’s
cost of shopping and making purchasing decisions’ . . . for it quickly and easily assures a potential
customer that this item—the item with this mark—is made by the same producer as other similarly
marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past. At the same time, the law helps assure a
producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards
associated with a desirable product . . . . It is the source—distinguishing ability of a mark—not its
ontological status as color, shape, fragrance, word, or sign—that permits it to serve these basic
purposes.” (citations omitted)).
2
Roger E. Schechter & John R. Thomas, Intellectual Property: The Law of Copyrights, Patents and
Trademarks 788 (West 2003).
3

E.g. PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 255 (6th Cir. 2003).

4

E.g. Brookfield Commun., Inc. v. W. Coast Ent. Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that
the use of a trademark as a metatag unduly influenced search engine results and was an infringing use).
“Metatags” are lines of computer code invisible to the viewer that can affect search engines such that the
results move a particular web page to a higher position on the list, making it more likely that a potential
customer will see that web page and use it. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 800 n. 2 (9th
Cir. 2002).
5
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Universal Tel-A-Talk, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17282 at **15-24 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 3, 1998).
6
When alleging infringement or confusion of source “it is clear that a plaintiff must show that it has
actually used the designation at issue as a trademark, and that the defendant has also used the same or a
similar designation as a trademark . . . . In other words, the plaintiff must establish a likelihood that the
defendant’s designation will be confused with the plaintiff’s trademark, such that consumers are
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the Lanham Act,7 the language chosen by the Sixth Circuit in Interactive
Products Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions seemingly creates a bright
line limit to the protection of trademarks on the Internet.8
When the court in Interactive Products Corporation (“IPC”) refused to
protect the trademark “Lap Traveler” held by Interactive Products
Corporation, it refused to apply the eight factor test articulated by the
Second Circuit in a prior trademark case, Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid
Electronics Corp.9 Instead, the IPC Court found that the “dark side” of the
web page address, the part after the “.com,” “[does] not typically signify
[the] source” of a product or sponsor.10 Thus, using a trademark in this part
of a complete web page address, or Uniform Resource Locator (URL),11
cannot be infringing and courts need not address this particular use in the
context of the Polaroid factor analysis.12 While the IPC decision left open
the theoretical possibility for finding infringement, the language chosen by
the court strongly suggests that it would never find infringement.13
This Note argues that the Sixth Circuit failed to correctly apply prior
case law and common technical knowledge. This failure and
misinterpretation led to the erroneous conclusion that using a trademark in
the post domain path14 of a URL can never indicate the source of content on
mistakenly led to believe that the defendant’s goods are produced or sponsored by the plaintiff.” Rock &
Roll Hall of Fame & Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prod., 134 F.3d 749, 753-54 (6th Cir. 1998) (citations
omitted).
7
The Lanham Act imposes liability on “[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or
services . . . uses in commerce . . . any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact,
or false or misleading representation of fact, which . . . is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake,
or to deceive . . . as to the origin . . . of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities.” 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a)(1)(A) (2000).
8

326 F.3d 687, 698 (6th Cir. 2003) (hereinafter IPC 2).

9

287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (espousing an eight-factor likelihood of confusion test used, with
minor variations, by most courts to determine if the use of a trademark is likely to confuse consumers as
to the source of a product); See infra note 39 for further explanation of the Polaroid test.
10

IPC 2, 326 F.3d at 698.

11

Every specific web page on the Internet is identified by its unique URL, which includes three
parts: (a) the transfer protocol required to access the file (e.g., “http” (“Hypertext Transfer Protocol”) for
files created in HTML, or “ftp” (“File Transfer Protocol”) for documents created using more traditional
word processing formats, etc.); (b) the domain name; and most important (c) the path on the host
computer to a particular directory and page. Rick Stout, The World Wide Web Complete Reference 19296 (McGraw Hill 1996); see also Natl. A-1 Advert. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 156, 174
(D.N.H. 2000); Chatam Intl., Inc. v. Bodum, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 549, 553 (S.D. Ohio 2001). For
example, the URL “http://www.exte.com/products/ibmcomputers.html” includes the protocol necessary
to access the site (“http://”) and the domain name or location of the host computer on the World Wide
Web (“www.exte.com”). The section “/products” refers to a particular directory on that computer and,
finally, “/ibmcomputers.html” refers to a particular file and web page in that directory.
12

IPC 2, 326 F.3d at 698.

13

Id. (stating “[I]t is unlikely that the presence of another’s trademark in a post-domain path of a
URL would ever violate trademark law.” (emphasis added)).
14

The post domain path of a URL consists of everything after the top level domain (“TLD”), which
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the web page. Section II of this Note provides the general factual and legal
background behind the IPC decision and addresses the technology at issue
in IPC. Section III discusses the court’s failure to address prior case law
opposing its holding, the erroneous factual and technological conclusions
reached by the court, and offers some possible solutions to the issues raised.
Section IV concludes by summarizing the arguments.
II. BACKGROUND
The Sixth Circuit’s ruling in IPC is the first federal appeals court ruling
directly on the use of trademarks in the post-domain path of URLs. With
the number of available domain names shrinking as people and companies
register their names and products, the facts and circumstances in IPC are
likely to become more common.15 This section details the facts of the IPC
case, the procedural history of the case leading up to the Sixth Circuit’s
decision, and the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in IPC.
A. The Facts Leading to the Dark Side of IPC
Mark Comeaux (“Comeaux”) and Douglas Mayer (“Mayer”) cofounded Interactive Products Corporation (“IPC”) in 1994.16 Together they
developed and sold a portable computer stand called the “Lap Traveler.”17
IPC registered Lap Traveler as a federal trademark.18 Between 1996 and
1998 the Defendant, a2z Mobile Office Solutions (“a2z”), a computer
accessories retailer, sold the Lap Traveler product on one of its web pages.19
In 1998, Comeaux and Mayer had a falling out and sought dissolution of
IPC in Ohio state courts.20 By December 1998, there was a settlement
agreement whereby Comeaux would buy out Mayer for $33,000 with IPC
retaining the exclusive right to use the Lap Traveler or model
designations.21 The agreement allowed Mayer to sell products similar or
identical to the Lap Traveler, claim that Mayer was co-inventor of the Lap
is normally a “.com,”“.org,” or “.net” among others. For further explanation of the technology and terms
see supra note 11 and infra note 64.
15

See infra n. 108 (explaining how the number of viable addresses on the Internet is shrinking).

16

IPC 2, 326 F.3d at 692.

17

Id. at 693.

18

Id.

19

The URL address where the Lap Traveler and Mobile Desk were
“[http://www.]a2zsolutions.com/desks/floor/laptraveler/dkfl-lt.htm.” Id. (emphasis added).
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IPC 2, 326 F.3d at 693.
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Id.
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Traveler, and to also engage in unrestricted free competition between the
former business partners.22
At the same time that Mayer and Comeaux’s relationship dissolved,
IPC and a2z’s relationship was also strained.23 In January 1999, Comeaux
terminated all business relationships between IPC and a2z.24 IPC also asked
a2z to remove references to the Lap Traveler from a2z’s website.25
After Mayer and Comeaux parted ways, Mayer started a second
company, Mobile Office Enterprises (“MOE”), which developed and sold a
similar stand called “The Mobile Desk.”26 Shortly thereafter a2z began
advertising and selling Mayer’s The Mobile Desk instead of the Lap
Traveler.27 However, a2z did not change its URL and posted the following
announcement based on a copy of the agreement between Mayer and
Comeaux stating:
Important Announcement about the Lap Traveler Product. The
original Lap Traveler was co-developed by Doug Mayer and his
ex-partner. They have split. a2z carries the redesigned and
improved product – The Mobile Desk.28
In August 1999, Comeaux performed several web searches on the
Internet using “laptraveler” and “lap traveler” as the keywords on various
search engines.29 These searches consistently produced results including
a2z’s portable-computer-stand web page as one of the highest results.30
B. Procedural History of IPC: The Road to the Dark Side
Based on the results from these searches Comeaux and IPC filed suit
against a2z and others in September, 1999.31 The complaint asserted inter
alia, that a2z’s use of the trademark “The Lap Traveler” violated the
Lanham Act, specifically the use constituted infringement under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(1) and false designation of origin under 15 U.S.C. § 1125.32 After

22

Id. at 692-93.

23

Id. at 693.

24

Id.

25

Id.

26

Id.

27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Id.

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Off. Solutions, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1034 (S.D. Ohio
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discovery ended, a2z moved for and was granted summary judgment on all
counts.33 Summary judgment was awarded on grounds that the use of the
Lap Traveler trademark in the post domain path of the URL did not signify
the source of the product.34 Additionally, the district court also stated that
applying the Polaroid eight factor analysis resulted in a finding that
consumers would not likely be confused by the alleged infringing use.35 IPC
appealed only the infringement and false designation of origin claims.36
C. The Sixth Circuit’s Decision to Stay on the Dark Side in IPC
Affirming the lower court’s ultimate ruling, the Sixth Circuit found
there was no need to address the likelihood of confusion because the postdomain path of a URL does not “typically signify source.”37 As a result, the
court found it “unlikely” that the use of a trademark in the post domain path
of a URL would ever indicate the source of the product.38 The Sixth Circuit
notes that to reach the typical Polaroid eight factor analysis for likelihood
of confusion, the trademark must be used in a source identifying manner or
else “trademark infringement and false designation of origin laws do not
apply.”39 Therefore, the lower court erred in applying the Polaroid eight
factors to the allegedly infringing use.40 The court in IPC relied principally
on Patmont Motor Werks v. Gateway Marine, holding that the use of a
2003) (hereinafter IPC 1), aff’d, 326 F.3d 687 (6th Cir. 2003).
33

Id.

34

Id.

35

Id.

36

IPC 2, 326 F.3d at 690.

37

Id. at 698.

38

Id.

39

Id. at 695. Most courts consider a Polaroid eight factor analysis, or a slight variation, when
determining if a likelihood of confusion exists. Schechter & Thomas, supra n. 2, at 640. The Polaroid
factors are (i) the strength of the plaintiff’s trademark; (ii) the degree of similarity between the parties’
marks; (iii) the proximity of the products; (iv) the likelihood that the plaintiff will “bridge the gap”
between the products; (v) the existence of actual confusion; (vi) the defendant’s good faith; (vii) the
quality of the defendant’s product; and (viii) the sophistication of the consumers. 287 F.2d at 495. In the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, a principal case listing the eights factors a court should consider is
Frisch’s Restaurant Inc. v. Elby’s Big Boy of Stuebenville Inc., 670 F.2d 642 (6th Cir. 1982). The
Frisch’s factors are (i) the strength of the senior mark; (ii) relatedness of the goods and services; (iii) the
similarity of the marks; (iv) evidence of actual confusion; (v) the marketing channels used; (vi) likely
degree of purchaser care; (vii) the intent of the defendant in selecting the mark; and (viii) the likelihood
of expansion of the product lines. Id. at 648. “These factors are not exhaustive and courts may consider
some or none of them, or expand upon them.” Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20756 at *85 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 19, 2003). The Sixth Circuit has also cautioned that “[e]ach case
presents its own complex set of circumstances and not all of these factors may be particularly helpful in
any given case.” Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1107 (6th
Cir. 1991).
40
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trademark in the post domain path of a URL can not be infringing.41 The
IPC Court echoed the Patmont ruling finding that since “[t]he post domain
path merely shows how the website’s data is organized within the host
computer’s files,” it is not acting as a source identifying trademark and its
use is not infringing.42
III. ANALYSIS
Over the last twenty years, trademark law has developed in response to
the rapid growth and exploitation of the Internet by businesses and
consumers. This relatively new and growing area requires courts to pay
careful attention to the facts of each case and the technology used by the
parties attempting to obtain protection of trademarks.43 Based on its
understanding, or lack of understanding, of the facts, the court in IPC erred
in concluding that trademarks in the post domain path of a URL can never
signify source.44 This section discusses how the court’s analysis in IPC
misapplies or ignores previous case law to reach its conclusion. Next, this
section discusses how the court in IPC erred in relying on a single footnote
from one case to assist in justifying its analysis, failing to properly consider
all the facts and technology issues present in IPC.45 Finally, this section
discusses possible solutions to the problems raised in this Note. Through
these failures, the court in IPC has created poor precedent which has the
potential to open whole new areas of trademark “infringement” on the
Internet by companies seeking to profit from the goodwill established by
the original owners of trademarks.
A. The Light Fades on the Dark Side: The IPC Court’s Failure to
Consider Past Case Law
A basic premise of liability under the Lanham Act46 is that a

41
Id. at 697; Patmont Motor Werks v. Gateway Marine, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20877 at *13, n. 6
(N.D. Cal December 17, 1997) (holding that as a matter of law the use of a trademark in the post domain
path of a URL does not suggest sponsorship or endorsement).
42

IPC 2, 326 F.3d at 696-97.

43

PACCAR, 319 F.3d at 250 (holding that each case must be addressed on its facts).

44

IPC 2, 326 F.3d at 698.

45

Id.

46

The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), “covers trademark infringement as well as a host of other
deceptive practices” that includes false designation of origin. Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 502 (6th
Cir. 1998). False designation of origin claims have two elements: “(1) the false designation must have a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce; and (2) the false designation must create a
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defendant’s use of a plaintiff’s trademark is likely to cause confusion
among consumers regarding the “origin of goods,” not the origin of the
specific factory, warehouse, or web page where the goods are made, stored,
or sold, respectively.47 Thus, when the court in IPC failed to analyze a2z’s
use of the trademark “The Lap Traveler” under a typical Polaroid analysis,
the IPC Court principally relied on the minimal analysis given by the
Patmont court.48 By holding that a2z’s use of the trademarks in a URL does
not signify source, it failed to properly analyze all previous case law on the
subject.49 Typically, the Sixth Circuit does not bar claims of initial interest
confusion on the Internet.50 Under the initial interest confusion doctrine,51 a
customer is lured into a store or to look at a web page which displays
familiar trademarks. However, the customer soon learns that the products
likelihood of confusion” that is analyzed under factors similar to those in Polaroid for an infringement
action. Id. The factors for determining likelihood of confusion for a false designation of origin claim
under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) are identical to those for a trademark infringement claim under 15 U.S.C. §
1114. Compare id. at 502-03 with Daddy’s Junky Music Stores v. Big Daddy’s Family Music Ctr., 109
F.3d 275, 280 (6th Cir. 1997).
47
See infra nn. 93-98 and accompanying text (discussing why courts should look at the “origin of
goods”). In its analysis, the IPC Court focuses on identifying the sponsorship of a web page and not the
products sold on a web page. IPC 2, 326 F.3d at 697-98. The Patmont Court’s analysis also seemingly
focused on the sponsorship of the web page instead of the product. 1997 U.S. Dist Lexis 20877 at *13,
n. 6. The IPC Court apparently mistakenly relies on the commentary in the Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition which states that the likelihood of confusion rule:

applies to all forms of confusion [of sponsorship], including the false belief that the [prior
user] of the mark has formally certified the goods as meeting particular standards . . . the false
belief that the [producer or distributor] is affiliated with [the prior user] . . . or the false belief
that the [producer or distributor] has [obtained] the approval of the [prior user] in
manufacturing or marketing the goods.
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 20 cmt. d (1995).
48

IPC 2, 326 F.3d at 698; see infra pt. III.A.1. for a detailed discussion of Patmont.

49

IPC 2, 326 F.3d at 698.

50

PACCAR, 319 F.3d at 253.

51

Initial interest confusion is a theory of trademark infringement that occurs when a customer
becomes confused as to the source of a product before a sale is made. Yelena Dunaevsky, Student
Author, Don’t Confuse Metatags With Initial Interest Confusion, 29 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1349, 1363
(2002). Under this theory the consumer will discover his initial confusion about the source of a product
before a sale, but instead of correcting his mistake and purchasing the product he initially wanted, the
customer will proceed to purchase the secondary product he initially mistook for the original. Most
courts agree that when a vendor intentionally diverts consumer attention from his competitor by using
the competitor’s trademark, or something that may be confused for the competitor’s trademark, the
vendor benefits unjustly from the competitor’s goodwill and can be accused of trademark infringement
under the Lanham Act. “In the context of the Internet, ‘the concern is that potential consumers of one
website (website 1) will be diverted and distracted to a competing website (website 2).’” Id. The harm
comes from the fact that potential consumers may believe that website 2 is associated with website 1 and
will be too lazy to resume their search for website 1. Alternatively, if they do not believe that there is
any association between websites 1 and 2, they may still choose to remain on website 2 because its
information may simply be appealing enough for them to abandon their initial search. In either situation,
the result is the diversion of potential consumers from their original search. See generally id. (footnotes
omitted).
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being sold are not of the brand names he thought were advertised. As a
result, the customer may or may not purchase the items he now knows are
not the name brands he originally intended to buy.52 Under this doctrine, as
it pertains to this case, the only confusion that matters is if the consumer
sees the trademark Lap Traveler in the post domain path of the URL for the
web page and then thinks the goods on that web page are associated with
the maker of the Lap Traveler. The decision in IPC limits the reach of the
initial interest confusion doctrine in the Sixth Circuit by refusing to apply it
to the post domain paths of a URL.53
The principle question that a court seeks to answer in an infringement
action is whether there is a likelihood of confusion between two source
identifying marks.54 In failing to reach this question where the marks are
identical,55 used by a company in competition with the trademark holder,56
and the product sold is of similar design and purpose as the original
trademark product,57 the IPC Court erred by considering only two cases
where neither case supported its decision with hard facts.
As the court in IPC noted, the issue before it was an issue of first
impression among the federal appellate courts.58 This section discusses the
Patmont ruling, as well as other trademark cases the IPC Court should have
utilized in order to provide a context in which to apply its final decision. Its
failure to consider other cases and its acceptance of the opinion of the
Patmont Court that trademarks in post domain paths do not signify source
without citing further support weakens the rationale behind its holding.59

52

The theory behind the initial interest confusion doctrine is similar to a “bait and switch” scam
where the customer sees a potentially high quality item with a familiar trademark on it, decides to
purchase the item, but actually purchases a low quality “knockoff” or fake item that he did not originally
intend to buy. Id.
53

IPC 2, 326 F.3d at 698.

54

Although the interstate commerce effect is necessary, a “likelihood of confusion is the essence of
an unfair competition claim” under the Lanham Act. Johnson, 149 F.3d at 502.
55

IPC 2, 326 F.3d at 695, n. 5 (finding that there is no “meaningful” difference between Lap
Traveler and laptraveler); Pub. Serv. Co. v. Nexus Energy Software, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 436, 444 (D.
Mass. 1999) (finding “Energy Place” and “energyplace” to be virtually identical).
56

IPC 2, 326 F.3d at 692.

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Id. at 698.
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1. The Beginnings of the Dark Side: The IPC Court’s Inappropriate
Reliance on Patmont
The central issue the IPC Court60 purported to address is “whether a
consumer is likely to notice [the Plaintiff’s trademark] in the post domain
path and then think that the [Defendant’s product] may be produced by the
same company . . . that makes the [Plaintiff’s Product].”61 The only case the
court employed to address and analyze this issue prior to IPC was Patmont,
where a California district court held that the post domain path of a URL
does not signify the source of a web page or web site.62 The Patmont Court
reached the conclusion that the post domain path of a URL does not signify
source in a footnote. However, independent of its analysis of the facts
before it, the court did note that the plaintiff failed to establish facts that
might cause it to reconsider the ultimate decision.63
The Patmont Court decided the issue on these two facts: post domain
paths show how a website’s data is organized within the host computer
files,64 and that "[n]othing in the post[ ]domain path of a URL indicates a
website’s source of origin.”65 While the court was correct in stating that the
post domain path normally does not indicate the source of a web site,66 the
60
It is interesting to note that the main case the Sixth Circuit relied on in IPC in assessing whether
the post domain path signified source, uses a test, “nominative fair use,” in its final decision that the
Sixth Circuit explicitly rejected barely two months earlier in Feb. 2003. PACCAR, 319 F.3d at 257.
61

IPC 2, 326 F.3d at 696 (emphasis added).

62

1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20877 at *13, n. 6. The IPC Court also notes that a second case, PACCAR,
cites Patmont without further analysis. IPC 2, 326 F.3d at 696.
63

1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20877 at *13, n. 6.

64

Id. There is a critical distinction between domain names and URLs. A domain name is only one
component of a URL. Stout, supra n. 11 at 192-94. Normally files on the Internet are organized under
directories which become part of the post domain path of a URL. Id. A domain name only describes a
specific entity, such as a server or system, commonly referred to as a web site or “home page” connected
to the Internet. Id. However, a domain name does not refer to a specific web page or any content on that
page as does the post domain path of a URL. Id at 195-96. The Federal Circuit recently distinguished a
web site from a web page stating:
Every web page is identified by a unique Uniform Resource Locator (URL). Web pages are
stored on ‘web sites’ [which are] locations on the World Wide Web comprising one or more
computers, known as servers. Every web site has a home page, which is identified by a URL and
is the first document users see when they first connect to the web site. Also associated with each
web site is a domain name, usually part of the URL.
Resonate Inc. v. Alteon Websystems, Inc., 338 F.3d 1360, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2003). See supra n. 11 for
further discussion and examples of URLs.
65

1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20877 at *13, n. 6 (relying on the same two facts cited by the IPC court)
(emphasis added).
66
Even the URLs for “home pages” of websites have a post domain path. “Web servers
automatically provide a [post domain path for all URL’s entered into] a browser” if the user does not
provide one. The most common name is index.html and since this “is the default name, organizations
almost always name their home pages index.html . . . [t]his way you don’t have to know” the post
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Patmont Court failed to address the issue of whether or not the use of a
trademark in the post domain path can help identify the source of goods for
67
sale on a web page. Thus, when the IPC Court principally relied on the
ruling and logic of Patmont any erroneous conclusions reached by the
Patmont Court were also used by the IPC Court in reaching a similar
conclusion.
Interestingly, the Patmont ruling conflicted with another ruling handed
down just two months earlier in the same District Court. In Playboy
Enterprises v. Calvin Designer Label,68 the court filed an injunction
prohibiting the use of Playboy Enterprise’s Inc. (“PEI”) trademark:
as Defendants’ domain name, directory name, or other such
computer address, as the name of Defendants’ Web site service, in
buried code or metatags on their home page or Web pages, or in
connection with the retrieval of data or information or on other
goods or services, or in connection with the advertising or
promotion of their goods, services or [W]eb sites.69
The Calvin Court issued this injunction two months before the Patmont
ruling, even though the only infringing use in Calvin was in the domain
name portion of the URL.70 By relying only one decision from a court with
conflicting rulings issued within months of each other the IPC Court failed
to properly consider all case law discussing this issue.71
2. First Light on the Dark Side: Questioning the Holdings in Patmont and
IPC
Patmont and Calvin were not the only cases involving alleged
confusion and infringement based, at least in part, on use of trademarks in
post domain paths of URLs. In Universal Tel-A-Talk, a dispute arose over
defendant’s use of PEI’s trademark “PLAYBOY” and other logos used on
the web page and in the post domain path of defendant’s URL.72 This court
found the use of the trademarks in the web page and post domain path of
the URL constituted an infringing use, likely to confuse consumers as to the
domain path of the URL to access the home page of a business or organization. Stout, supra n. 11, at
195-96.
67

1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20877 at *13, n. 6.

68

985 F. Supp. 1220 (S.D. Cal. 1997).

69

Id. at 1221 (emphasis added).

70

Id.

71

Patmont, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20877 at *13, n. 6; Calvin, 985 F. Supp. at 1220.

72

1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17282, at *14. (The URL in question in Universal Tel-A-Talk was
http://www.adult_sex.com/playboy/members).
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source and sponsor of the website.73 Specifically, it found that the
defendant’s use was “an effort to capitalize on [Playboy’s] established
reputation,” and constituted infringement of plaintiff’s trademark.74
Although not explicitly stating that the use of the mark PLAYBOY in the
post domain path was infringing, the Universal Tel-A-Talk Court
specifically notes that the infringing mark was identical to the plaintiff’s
mark and enjoined the defendant’s from:
using in any manner the PLAYBOY trademarks or any term or
terms likely to cause confusion therewith as defendant’s domain
name, directory, or other such computer address, as the name of
their Web site service, on their home page, on computer diskettes
or in connection with the retrieval of data or information or on
other goods or services, or in connection with the advertising or
promotion thereof.75
A similar injunction was issued in Pepper’s Fine Foods, Inc. v.
Pepper’s Butcher Shop & Deli.76 As in Universal Tel-A-Talk, the court in
Pepper’s Fine Foods did not reach the explicit conclusion that the use of a
trademark in the post domain path could be confusing as to source.
However the court enjoined the defendants from:
directly or indirectly using Plaintiff’s Marks, or any other
confusingly similar mark or colorable imitation, in any manner or
for any reasons, as a corporate name, [I]nternet domain, web page,
uniform resource location (“URL”), fictitious name filing,
trademark or service mark on supplies, printed matter, [or]
electronic media.77
Another California district court case dealing with the use of a
trademark in the post domain path was Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v.
Faber.78 In Faber, the defendant operated a web page under the URL
“www.compupix.com/ballysucks,” where he placed complaints about
Bally’s health club business.79 The court found this use to be a nontrademark use because “[n]o reasonable consumer comparing Bally’s
73
The court specifically notes that the use of the trademark in the post domain path is identical to the
plaintiff’s mark. Id. at **14, 22-23.
74

Id. at *15.

75

Id. at **14, 22-23 (emphasis added). The wording in Universal Tel-A-Talk is similar to that in
Calvin, suggesting that the court in Universal, simply followed Calvin’s lead.
76

2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 25925 at **3-4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2002).

77

Id. (emphasis added).

78

29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1162-64 (C.D. Cal. 1998).

79

Id. (finding that since there is no possibility of confusion as to source, plaintiff’s claims fail as a
matter of law).
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official web site with Faber’s” web page would assume that Faber’s page
was sponsored, came from, or was connected or affiliated with the
trademark owner.80 It is important to note that the Faber Court did not
address whether the use in the post domain path was sufficient without the
word “sucks” to potentially confuse consumers as to source.81 This case is
an example of a non-trademark use that is not actionable under the Lanham
Act as opposed to the use of a trademark that is actionable under the
Lanham Act by the trademark holder.82
If the IPC Court had employed cases like Universal Tel-A-Talk and
Pepper’s Fine Foods in its analysis, it is likely that the court in IPC would
have been forced, at a minimum, to distinguish these cases instead of
relying heavily on the short analysis provided by Patmont and the IPC
District Court’s ruling.83 Universal Tel-A-Talk and Pepper’s Fine Foods are
two cases that represent the greater number of cases that choose to enjoin
all use of trademarks in the URL.84
Although the Universal Tel-A-Talk Court did not base its decision to
enjoin the use of the trademark solely on the trademark’s use in the post
domain path of the URL, the court’s injunction specifically covers all
actions that it found to be infringing uses.85 In contrast to Universal Tel-ATalk, the Pepper’s Fine Foods decision prohibits the defendants from using
the disputed trademark in any manner in any URL even though this issue
may not have been litigated.86
Another California case sheds doubt on the brief analysis provided in
Patmont and IPC. In July 2002, the district court in Metro Publishing., Inc.
v. Surfmet, Inc., found that defendant’s SURFMETRO mark was likely to
cause confusion with plaintiff’s use of the METRO and METROACTIVE
80

Id. at 1163-64.

81

Id. at 1164 (finding that the attachment of the word sucks is not a minor change).

82

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); Compare Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161 with Daddy’s Junky Music Stores, 109
F.3d at 280.
83

IPC 2, 326 F.3d at 697-98; IPC 1, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 1030-31 (citing Patmont as the only case
directly addressing this issue).
84
See generally Metro Publg., Inc. v. Surfmet, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26232 (N.D. Cal. July 3,
2002); 66 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 1553 (9th Cir. Jan.
21, 2003) (affirming the district court without discussion). However, courts can choose to specifically
enjoin use in only domain names. See e.g. Scan Design of Fla., Inc. v. Scan Design Furniture, Inc., 2001
U.S. Dist. Lexis 7945 at *20 (S.D. Fla. May 18, 2001).
85
Instead the court based its ruling of infringement on that fact that the defendants were actually
using the trademark in the text of the web page, using other logos held by PEI, and the intent of the
defendants was clearly to deceive customers. Universal Tel-A-Talk, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17282 at
*14.
86

The court’s opinion has very few details about the actual case, therefore it is difficult to tell if the
parties litigated the post domain path issue or if the court simply enjoined use of the trademark sua
sponte. Pepper’s Fine Foods, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25925 at **3-4.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol29/iss3/5

2004]

THE DARK SIDE OF THE DOT COMS

477

as marks.87 The Metro Court stated in its injunction that the defendant could
not use the “METRO mark as part of its domain names—‘metrosurf.com’
and ‘surfmetro.com’—[as] those domain names’ corresponding URL
addresses and any other domain name or URL address are confusingly
similar to the METRO or METROACTIVE marks.”88 When the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the injunction finding no abuse of discretion by the trial
court, the court implicitly held that post domain paths of a URL address can
signify source.89 Therefore, in affirming Metro, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals seemingly overrules the Patmont holding principally relied on by
the IPC Court.90 Universal Tel-A-Talk, Pepper’s Fine Food, Metro and
others91 indicate that the use of trademarks in the post-domain path of a
URL could identify the source of products or sponsorship of a web page.
The IPC Court’s failure to distinguish the facts of IPC from these cases
weakens the analysis provided by the court; it refused to find that the use of
a trademark in the post domain path of a URL could be infringing.
3. The Light Fades on the Dark Side: The IPC Court’s Perplexing
Confusion in its Decision
Previous Internet trademark decisions by the Sixth Circuit state that
“[t]he touchstone of liability under [the Lanham Act] § 111492 is whether
the defendant’s use of the disputed mark is likely to cause confusion among
consumers regarding the origin of the goods offered by the parties”93 and
that the “[u]se of a trademark in such a way as to confuse, mislead, or
deceive persons as to the manufacturer, producer or source of origin of the
product is prohibited by [the Lanham Act] 15 U.S.C. § 1125.”94 In its
analysis, the IPC Court seems to focus on identifying the source of a web

87

2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26232 at **27-28.

88

Id. at *30.

89

Metro Publg., Inc. v. Surfmet, Inc., 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1553 (9th Cir. Cal. Jan. 21, 2003)
(stating that abuse of discretion occurs only if the district court based its decision on either an erroneous
legal standard or clearly erroneous factual findings).
90

Id.

91

See e.g. Howard Johnson Intl., Inc. v. Craven Props. Ltd., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19744 (M.D.
Fla. June 12, 2002).
92

Likelihood of confusion analysis for violations of § 1114 and § 1125 are identical. See supra note
46 and accompanying text for further discussion.
93
Daddy’s Junky Music Stores, 109 F.3d at 280 (stating also that “when determining whether a
likelihood of confusion exists, a court must examine and weigh” the Polaroid eight factors) (emphasis
added).
94
Dolphin Seafoods, Inc. v. Zartic, Inc., 1983 U.S. Dist LEXIS 11132 at *25 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 5,
1983) (citing Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1963)).
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page and not the products sold on the web pages.95 Considering the IPC
Court closely followed the Patmont ruling, which misidentified the proper
question for analysis, it is not surprising that the IPC Court also failed to
identify the proper question to be addressed.96
In ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., the Sixth Circuit noted that not
every use of a protectable trademark qualifies for protection, rather it must
be proven that the trademark identifies one source of goods and
distinguishes it from another source, even if consumers do not know the
exact source of the goods.97 In Dastar Corp. v Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., the Supreme Court defined “origin of goods” within the meaning of
the Lanham Act to “refers to the producer of tangible goods that are offered
for sale.”98
The IPC Court discusses the differences between a trademark use in a
domain name and in the post-domain path of a URL.99 However, it
addresses the wrong question in trying to determine if there could ever be a
likelihood of confusion as to the source of the web page based on the use of
a trademark in the post domain path of a URL.100 Under Dastar,101 the more
appropriate question for IPC’s false designation of origin claim is whether
there is a likelihood of confusion as to the source of origin of the goods or
services being offered on that web page.102 In fact, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals stated this proposition two months earlier in Taubman Co. v.
Webfeats.103 In Taubman, the Sixth Circuit stated that under the Lanham
Act “the only important question is whether there is a likelihood of
confusion between the parties’ goods or services . . . it is irrelevant whether
customers would be confused as to the origin of the web sites” or web

95

IPC 2, 326 F.3d 696-98; Patmont, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 20877 at *13, n.6.

96

IPC 2, 326 F.3d at 696-98.

97

332 F.3d 915, 921 (6th Cir. 2003).

98

539 U.S. 23, 123 S. Ct. 2041, 2049 (2003). “The essence of a trademark is a designation in the
form of a distinguishing name, symbol or device which is used to identify a person’s goods and
distinguish them from the goods of another.” ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 921.
99

IPC 2, 326 F.3d at 696-98.

100

Id. The court does address the product aspect of the confusion as to source, but seemingly only as
an afterthought after fully discussing the likelihood of confusion as to source of the web page without
analyzing the possibility of a confusion as of source of the product. Id. at 698 (stating “the presence of
“laptraveler” in the post-domain path of a2z’s portable-computer-stand web page is [not] likely to cause
consumer confusion regarding the source of the web page or the source of the Mobile Desk”).
101

123 S. Ct. at 2049.

102

Ironically, the Sixth Circuit stated this in the first paragraph of its analysis but failed to follow its
own guideline later. IPC 2, 326 F.3d at 694 (stating “IPC must show that the presence of its trademark in
the post-domain path of a2z’s portable-computer-stand web page is likely to cause confusion among
consumers regarding the origin of the goods offered by the parties” (emphasis added)).
103

319 F.3d 770 (6th Cir. 2003).
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pages.104 The IPC Court’s failure to analyze the proper question and to
follow its own precedent calls into question the rationale provided by the
court to justify its holding.
B. The Failure to Address the Facts and Technology of the Dark Side in
IPC
The IPC Court fails to address, or errs in the analysis of, the factual and
technology issues raised by IPC. It provides no evidence to support its
analysis of typical online consumers and fails to fully identify and
understand the role of the post domain path in a URL. It also fails to
address the disclaimer placed on the web page and the possible effects this
had on a likelihood of confusion claim under the initial interest confusion
doctrine.
1. Failing to Properly Understand How Online Consumers May View the
Dark Side
Web sites and pages are used by many companies to provide product
information and sell products online.105 Individuals use the Internet to send
messages, locate information, and purchase goods.106 The IPC Court stated
that Internet users “will often begin by guessing the domain name” by
typing a company or product name directly into an Internet browser.107
However, as other courts have noted, “[m]ore often, users do not know the
exact address and must rely on ‘search engines’ available on the Web to
search for key words and phrases associated” with the desired web page, at
least when accessing the web page for the first time.108
104

Id. at 776.

105

Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 2000); Morrison &
Foerster, LLP v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1126 (D. Colo. 2000).
106

See Kiersten Conner-Sax & Ed Krol, The Whole Internet, The Next Generation: A Completely
New Edition of the First—and Best—User’s Guide to the Internet Chs. 3-5 (O’Reilly & Assocs. 1999).
107
108

326 F.3d at 691.

Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, 985 F. Supp. 949, 952 (C.D. Cal. 1997); See also
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 852 (1997) (stating that often users do not know the exact address and
must rely on search engines available on the Web to search for key words and phrases associated with
the desired Web site). Users generally explore a given Web page, or move to another, by clicking a
computer ‘mouse’ on one of the page’s icons or links. Domain names have been compared to “a street
address [that] tells people where they can find a particular home or business.” Chatam Intl., 157 F. Supp.
2d at 553. However the exponential growth of the Internet has begun to severely limit the number of
possible useful domain names and this analogy may not be as useful as it once was, especially as the
number of web pages on the Internet continues to grow. See generally Kevin J. Heller, Student Author,
The Young Cybersquatter’s Handbook: A Comparative Analysis of the ICANN Dispute, 2 Cardozo
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The use of a search engine results in a “shotgun” approach that will find
all web pages on the Internet containing the particular word or phrase a user
is searching for.109 The use of these engines to find web sites and web pages
associated with a specific company or product becomes even more likely
where the address of a web page is not easily deduced or known, such as
when there are several companies trying to use the same trademark, such as
“acme” or “delta.”110 The current state of search engine technology and the
number of web pages on the Internet often results in a list of hundreds of
web pages through which the user must sort in order to find what he or she
is looking for.111 Companies strongly prefer that their trademarks be used as
little as possible by others on the Internet so that search engine results give
concise and usable results, given the possibility of a prolific number of
results from the use of a search engine.112
The IPC Court failed to adequately address the use of a search engine
by consumers in its analysis.113 This is surprising because in the technology
section of the opinion, the court specifically addresses how search engines
Online J. Confl. Resol. 2 (2001) (stating that:
More domain names are being registered, and there are more registrars to do it than ever before.
In fact, the Internet may be running out of space. In the most popular top level domain, <.com>,
it seems that almost every recognizable word has been claimed. Whereas trademark law permits
multiple parties to use the same mark for different classes of goods and services; the current
organization of the Internet permits only one use of a domain name, regardless of the goods or
services offered. That is, although two or more businesses can own the trademark “Acme,” only
one business can operate on the Internet with the domain name “acme.com.” Such a limitation
conflicts with trademark principles and hinders the use [of] the Internet by businesses.
(footnotes omitted)).
Thus, a web site encompasses all the web pages that begin with a particular domain name, just as the
cite name or zip code encompasses all the street addresses within its boundaries. Therefore a more apt
analogy may be that the domain name is similar to a city’s name or zip code on a letter’s address, and the
post domain path is more similar to the street address representing the location of the specific
information (i.e. the home or business) the user wishes to access (i.e. send the letter to). However,
several courts do not seem to understand these distinctions or they confuse the terms web site and web
page. E.g. Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 266 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating “[a]
domain name tells users where they can find a particular web page, much like a street address tells
people where they can find a particular home or business.” (emphasis added)). However, a domain name
merely indicates the web site’s name, and does not indicate the location of a web page. Stout, supra n.
11, at 192-94. The proliferation of the “country” TLD’s will likely do little to alleviate this problem as
the companies with the established trademark and domain names are quickly rushing in to register their
names in other countries and generic TLD’s to prevent others from obtaining them.
109

See Kiersten Conner-Sax & Ed Krol, supra n. 106, at 412-20.

110

See IPC 2, 326 F.3d 687; Lockheed Martin, 985 F. Supp. at 952 (finding that an easily deduced
address is directly related to the company or product being searched for). For example, to find the web
site of the IBM Corporation, a person may deduce that the web site, or home page, is www.ibm.com.
But if a user were to look for Delta Carpets and deduce that the home page is at www.delta.com, they
might be surprised when the browser displays the home page of Delta Airlines.
111

Sporty’s Farm, 202 F.3d at 493.

112

Id.

113

IPC 2, 326 F.3d at 694-98.
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are used.114 The basis for the initial complaint by IPC claimed that searches
for IPC’s trademark, Lap Traveler, on several engines, resulted in listing
a2z’s web page as a potential positive hit.115 Still in a footnote, the court
does acknowledge the results from the use of search engines, but states that
no evidence was presented by IPC as to why the search engines gave the
erroneous results.116 The court may be correct in stating that users are more
likely to know the domain name, than a complete URL.117 However, it
provides no support for its implicit proposition that users are more likely to
enter the domain name rather than use a search engine to locate the desired
web page. Yet, researchers investigating techniques used to search the
Internet have learned that when people do not know where the information
sought is located they are likely to either use a search engine or browse the
Internet.118
Therefore, when the IPC Court refused to find trademark use in the post
domain path of a URL to be infringing, the court rejected any initial interest
confusion claim IPC could have brought. The only basis to hold a2z liable
for the use of IPC’s trademark is under the initial interest confusion
doctrine; given that a customer making a purchase on a2z’s allegedly
infringing web page would know that the product was not IPC’s Lap
Traveler.
2. Affects of the Dark Side: Failure to Understand the Role of a Post
Domain Path in a URL
The IPC Court failed to understand the multiple functions that post
domain paths serve.119 Just as trademarks serve more than one function,120
the post domain path of a URL can tell how data is organized on a web
server and provide information about the content of those sites.121 Recent

114

Id. at 691-92.

115

Id. at 693. The President of IPC began the suit based on the results obtained when he performed
these searches. Id. at 698, n. 7.
116

Id.

117

See id. at 697.

118

Browsing is defined as the searching of the Internet by following links from one page to the next
until the desired information is found. Chris Olston and Ed Chi, Scent Trails: Integrating Browsing and
Searching on the Web, http://www2.parc.com/istl/projects/uir/pubs/items/UIR-2003-03-Chi-ACMTCHIScentTrails.pdf (accessed December 5, 2003) (proposing a way to integrate search engines and
browsing). The Palo Alto Research Center has several other projects involving research on the web in
progress which are viewable at http://www2.parc.com/istl/projects/uir/publications/index.html.
119
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See Stout, supra n. 11, at 194-98.

120

See Schechter & Thomas, supra n. 2, at 546-49.

121

Stout, supra n. 11, at 194-98.
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decisions by the Sixth Circuit have held that a domain name can signify the
source of a web site122 and no two organizations can have the same domain
name in combination with the top level domain.123 As noted earlier, domain
names have been compared to “a street address [that] tells people where
they can find a particular home or business.”124 Thus, the fictional URL
address “http://www.exte.com/ibmcomputers.html” could be a web page
selling computers and it is likely that potential consumers would think that
the computers were made by IBM.
Consumers do not need to know the true source of a product;
consumers are only required to know that the products being purchased
come from a specific “albeit anonymous, source.”125 To determine if there is
a likelihood of confusion between two trademarks, courts normally apply
the Polaroid eight factor test to determine if the alleged infringing
trademark identifies the source of the infringers’ products.126 However, the
IPC Court did not reach this analysis because it determined that the
defendant’s use of the trademark did not identify the source of the web
page.127
Given that the available number of domain names is constantly
shrinking, it makes sense for companies to start using the post domain paths
as an indication of source.128 This is especially true after Dastar, which
defined the “origin of goods” to be the producer of tangible goods,129 which
includes distributor companies using the trademark, as a2z did in the post
domain path of the URL.130
IPC’s previous business arrangement with a2z, to sell the Lap Traveler,
in all probability established a2z as a distributor of this type of product.131
As result, a2z built a solid customer base for the Lap Traveler.132

122

PACCAR, 319 F.3d at 250.

123

Chatam Intl., 157 F. Supp. 2d at 553. See also supra n. 108 (discussing domain names).

124

Virtual Works, 238 F.3d at 266. See supra n. 64 for a description of the functions of domain

names.
125
E.g. Comerica Inc. v. Fifth Third Bankcorp, 282 F. Supp. 2d 557, 563 n. 6 (E.D. Mich. 2003)
(stating “[t]rademarks are intended to designate a single, albeit an anonymous source”) (quoting Key
West Fragrance & Cosmetic Factory, Inc. v. The Mennen Co., 216 U.S.P.Q. 168, 170 (Trademark Tr. &
App. Bd. 1982)).
126

In the context of the Internet this is normally done under the initial interest confusion test. See
supra nn. 51-52 for further discussion of the initial interest confusion doctrine.
127

IPC 2, 326 F.3d at 697-98.

128

See supra note 108 for discussion of how the number of domain names is shrinking.

129

123 S. Ct. at 2049.

130

IPC 2, 326 F.3d at 693.

131

Id.

132

Although the complaint centered around IPC’s president searching the Internet and finding the
allegedly infringing web page and URL, there was also hearsay evidence, not admitted, that at least two
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Immediately after the falling out between Comeaux and Mayer, a2z began
selling a competing product of the same or similar design and function
called, the Mobile Desk.133
Some first time customers seeking the Lap Traveler would likely use a
search engine to search for the desired product and see the URL
“a2zsolutions.com/desks/floor/laptraveler/dkfl-lt.html” in the results list.134
Under Dastar and Polaroid all that is required for there to a be a likelihood
of confusion as to source under the initial interest confusion doctrine, is that
a user seeing this URL and the goods offered on the web page for sale,
experience confusion as to who is the actual source of the “tangible good
for purchase.”135 Given that IPC is the sole owner of the Lap Traveler
trademark, a2z’s selling of a different product, similar to IPC’s product,
should be enough to cause confusion among reasonable consumers as to the
source of the producer of the tangible goods offered on a2z’s web page, not
the sponsors of the website. Consider another example involving this
situation, specifically a vendor that advertises COCA-COLA™ but only
stocks a generic brand. On a hot day, a thirsty customer may enter intending
to buy a COCA-COLA™ product. Upon realizing that the vendor only has
the generic brand, the customer may leave and no infringement occurs
under initial interest confusion. However, if that customer decides it is too
far to walk to the next store selling COCA-COLA™ and he purchases the
generic brand, then COCA-COLA™ company will have a claim for
infringement against the vendor under initial interest confusion because
COCA-COLA™ lost a sale and profits to the vendor selling a generic cola
product. In the same manner, if a potential IPC customer sees the Lap
Traveler trademark, visits a2z’s web page, buys the Mobile Desk, knowing
it is not the Lap Traveler, then IPC will have a claim against a2z for
infringement under initial interest confusion.
In failing to recognize that the post domain path of a URL has the
potential to signify the source of products on the web page, the IPC Court
failed to properly analyze the effect the post domain path has on a
likelihood of confusion claim under the Lanham Act.136 Just as the domain
name is important to signify the source of a web site, the post domain path
of a URL can be just as important to signify web page source. Therefore the
court in IPC erred in suggesting that the post domain path of a URL can
potential customers of IPC were confused. However, IPC presented no further evidence of other
customer confusion and the court found the lack of proof of customer confusion persuasive. IPC 1, 195
F. Supp. 2d at 1033 (finding that “unless we have been seriously misled about the size of the market for
this kind of product, two customers hardly constitutes a significant portion” of the customer base).
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IPC 2, 326 F.3d at 692-93.

134

Id. at 692.

135

Dastar, 123 S. Ct. at 2049; see Taubman Co., 319 F.3d at 776.

136

IPC 2, 326 F.3d at 698.
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never signify source.
3. The Effect of the Disclaimer on the Dark Side
A final issue the IPC Court neglected to analyze is the effect of the
disclaimer a2z posted on the page selling the Mobile Desk.137 The
disclaimer placed on the web page stated:
Important announcement about the Lap Traveler Product[.] The
original Lap Traveler was co-developed by Doug Mayer [and] his
ex-partner. They have split. a2z carries the redesigned and
improved product-The Mobile Desk.138
The district court only analyzed the disclaimer issue under a literally
false standard.139 IPC correctly did not challenge the announcement as
literally false; however, the statement was challenged as misleading.140 The
district court found that Mayer and his ex-partner, Comeaux, designed the
Lap Traveler, they did split, and a2z did carry a redesigned product called
The Mobile Desk.141 Therefore, the statement posted on the web page was
essentially true and not literally false. However, “[l]iability under [the
Lanham Act] is not restricted solely to descriptions and representations that
are literally false. Relief may be granted if the actions of the defendants
create a false impression.”142 As a result, if a company or person makes a
true statement that creates a “false impression” using another’s trademark,
they may be liable for infringement.
The IPC Court did not address this potential issue of a2z’s liability,
because IPC did not make the argument that the announcement contributed
to the search engine hits and might be actionable under an initial interest
confusion analysis.143 Two months prior to the IPC decision, in PACCAR
Inc. v. TeleScan Technologies, L.L.C., the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
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held that a disclaimer “does not remedy [the] confusion caused by the use
of [a trademark] in [a] domain name.”144 Approximately two weeks prior to
the holding in IPC, the Northern District of California found that using a
trademark in a non-trademark manner more than what is reasonably
necessary, is actionable, and can be enjoined.145 IPC could have argued that
the disclaimer used more than reasonably necessary the trademark Lap
Traveler. The post-domain path, by itself, will not cause a search engine to
place a particular web page higher on the list of results from a search.146 As
a result, the only likely cause of the high ranking of a2z’s web page on the
search engine, and the cause of all of the potential confusion resulting from
these hits, was a2z’s “overuse” of IPC’s trademark in a2z’s disclaimer.147
C. Bringing Light Back to the Dark Side: Possible Solutions to the IPC
Dilemma
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in IPC is likely to reopen
the doors of infringement closed by the Lanham and Anti Cyber-squatting
Acts.148 IPC allows the use of trademarks to “organize” web sites in formats
that can attract consumers away from the trademark owner’s site. Allowing
web page operators and businesses to circumvent the Lanham and Anti
Cyber-squatting Acts will result in a lack of ability of trademark holders to
protect their interests; those operators and businesses that use the
trademarks to “organize” their web pages will be able to advertise these
web pages and potentially attract customers away from the trademark
owners, in opposition to the principles of trademark law.149 The example
web page previously described “http://www.exte.com/ibmcomputers.html”
is a legal use of the trademark IBM™ under the rule set forth in IPC, even if
the company exte.com sells computers on that web page and attracts
customers away from IBM™ with lower prices or other business tactics.
As companies increasingly turn to the Internet to sell their goods to the
public, the resulting searches and advertisement of specific web pages will
likely increase the frequency of the situation faced in IPC. A possible
solution is to analyze all uses of trademarks anywhere in URLs under the
Polaroid or similar test, so long as the use of the trademark at issue has the
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potential to suggest the source of goods on that web page.150 Under the test
courts might consider the length and placement of the trademark in the
URL. Placement of a trademark in a long URL, such as the one in IPC, may
have less likelihood of confusion than a shorter example of
“http://www.exte.com/ibmcomputers.html,” where the trademark of IBM™
computers is prominently placed in the URL. Under this analysis, courts
may find that the use of IBM™ is infringing because it is easier to see the
IBM trademark than the Lap Traveler trademark. The IBM trademark is
more likely to be noticed by the customer so that the customer is enticed to
visit that web page and potentially buy the non-trademark product, creating
a high likelihood of confusion under the initial interest confusion doctrine.
Also courts may wish to look at the placement of the trademark within
the URL. Burying the trademark in the middle of a long URL may be less
likely to confuse customers than placing it at the end or right after the .com,
where it is easily seen and is more likely to be acted upon, creating a higher
likelihood of confusion. A final factor that courts may want to consider is
whether the alleged infringing use has been advertised because the
advertisement or text may contain the complete URL which users can enter
into their browsers, thus they will be expecting to see the trademark
product, creating a higher likelihood of confusion, as above.151
IV. CONCLUSION
The Sixth Circuit erred by essentially forbidding all trademark
infringement claims where the trademark is used in the post domain path of
a URL. The IPC Court erred by ruling that essentially no use of a trademark
in the post domain path of a URL can infringe, by not considering past case
law and misunderstanding the facts and technology behind the case.
Although the court in IPC may have ultimately ruled that a2z’s use of
Lap Traveler in the “dark side” was not infringing use, to create a bright
line rule stating that all uses of trademarks in the post domain path of a
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URL “do not typically” signify source is not good precedent because the
number of possible domain names is shrinking daily and the use of
trademarks in the post domain paths of URLs may be the only option
companies have to exploit their trademarks on the Internet.
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